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INTRODUCTION
The United States has recently faced an unprecedented influx of
Central Americans seeking asylum within its borders.  Between 2011 and
2014 alone, hundreds of thousands of people, including many children
from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, fled their home countries in
hopes of gaining asylum.1  A variety of factors led to this rush of immi-
* Cornell Law School, J.D. expected 2016.  I am deeply grateful to Stephen Yale-Loehr
for introducing me to asylum law and for his insightful comments on early drafts of this Note,
to Sital Kalantry for her continued mentorship, and to “P.C.” for placing her trust in me and in
the Asylum and Convention Against Torture Appellate Clinic.  Thank you also to the editors
of the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy for their suggestions and improvements
throughout the editorial process.
1 MARC R. ROSENBLUM, UNACCOMPANIED CHILD MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES:
THE TENSION BETWEEN PROTECTION AND PREVENTION 2 (2015).
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gration, including a rise in violence (the homicide rate in Honduras is the
highest in the world, and those of El Salvador and Guatemala follow
closely behind), extreme poverty, and widespread corruption in govern-
ment and police.2
U.S. immigration detention centers and the immigration adjudica-
tion system have been left reeling from the surge.  The Obama adminis-
tration has worked to address this immigration crisis by increasing
detention space for families, adding a separate docket for children and
families in order to lessen delays, as well as reaching out to Latin Ameri-
can governments to try to curb the influx of asylum-seekers through de-
terrence and increased border security.3  These measures were successful
in decreasing the flow of asylum-seekers arriving at the border.4  Never-
theless, the crisis remains ongoing as adults and children languish in in-
humane, prison-like detention centers for months and years while their
asylum cases are processed.5  Many of the Central American asylum-
seekers have fled due to domestic violence that is largely ignored by
authorities in their home countries.6  While the United States decides
what to do with them, domestic violence victims7 risk being re-trauma-
tized and abused while detained.8
This Note concerns itself with how best to ensure that women seek-
ing asylum on the grounds of domestic violence are able to gain protec-
tion from the United States.  Pro-immigrant rights groups have advocated
for improved conditions for detained women; the American Civil Liber-
ties Union (ACLU) has sued the United States for detaining women and
children with legitimate and credible asylum claims as a deterrence strat-
egy.9  Women at the Karnes family detention center in Texas have taken
matters into their own hands and launched a hunger strike to protest their
2 Id. at 11–12.
3 Id. at 2.
4 Id.
5 Wil S. Hylton, The Shame of America’s Family Detention Camps, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-americas-family-
detention-camps.html?_r=0.
6 Case Examples of Families in Detention and Subject to Rapid Deportation, AM. IMMI-
GRATION LAWYERS ASS’N (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.aila.org/infonet/family-detention-case-
examples.
7 For some, “victim” carries negative connotations: the term implies weakness or lack
of agency.  Others find “victim” to be more descriptive of the abuse suffered and find that
“survivor” glosses over these experiences.  I recognize and respect both points of view.  For
purposes of this Note, however, I have elected to use “victim” because it is a broader term,
including those who were killed by their abuser or who ended their own lives as result of
domestic violence-related trauma.
8 Domestic Violence Advocates Call for End of Family Detention, AM. IMMIGRATION
LAWYERS ASS’N 1 (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.aila.org/infonet/domestic-violence-advos-end-
of-family-detention.
9 Federal Court Blocks Government from Detaining Asylum Seekers as Tactic to Deter
Others from Coming to U.S., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.aclu
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inhumane treatment.10  Perhaps the most important component to ade-
quate protection of these women, however, is securing stable legal foot-
ing for domestic violence as a basis for asylum.  To do so, the United
States must clarify its policy regarding domestic violence as persecution.
Recent developments have taken small steps towards this goal, but more
sweeping measures are needed.
On August 26, 2014, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the
highest administrative immigration appeals board in the United States,
decided Matter of A-R-C-G-.11  The controversial decision addressed for
the first time the question of granting asylum to domestic violence vic-
tims on the basis that domestic violence is a form of persecution.  The
BIA held that the respondents, a Guatemalan woman and her three minor
children who entered the United States illegally to escape her abusive
husband, were eligible for asylum based on past persecution or a well-
founded fear of future persecution on account of their belonging to a
“particular social group.”12  The BIA’s decision found that the particular
social group in question was comprised of “married women in Guate-
mala who are unable to leave their relationship.”13  While narrowly held,
this decision expanded the “particular social group” category of asylum
eligibility. Matter of A-R-C-G- opened the door to the inclusion of cer-
tain victims of domestic violence, giving rise to the possibility of an even
more expansive application of the “particular social group” category in
future asylum cases.
While human rights advocates and women’s groups have hailed the
decision as a major victory for women’s rights and domestic violence
victims,14 this Note argues that the decision’s long-term impact is over-
stated.  The immediate outcome is positive—a vulnerable family now
has the possibility to escape further violence and abuse—and the BIA’s
decision certainly has important symbolic significance.  In the long run,
however, the decision expands the already confusing and muddy “partic-
ular social group” category of asylum, which will reduce predictability
.org/news/federal-court-blocks-government-detaining-asylum-seekers-tactic-deter-others-com-
ing-us.
10 Oliver Laughland & Alan Yuhas, Mothers Held at Texas Detention Centre Go on
Hunger Strike to Demand Release, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2015/apr/01/mothers-texas-karnes-detention-center-hunger-strike.
11 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014).
12 Id. at 388–89.
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., Amy Grenier, Landmark Decision on Asylum Claims Recognizes Domestic
Violence Victims, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Sept. 2, 2014), http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/
09/02/landmark-decision-on-asylum-claims-recognizes-domestic-violence-victims/; CGRS Ap-
plauds Decision that Could Help Women and Children at Artesia Detention Center, UNIV. OF
CAL., HASTINGS CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.icon
tact-archive.com/QFS-zoj1ul57i8PSf-6LKzKZmjJEO7j3?w=3.
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about how the category is interpreted and leave victims of domestic vio-
lence exposed to court subjectivity.  Further, because the decision was
framed narrowly, immigration judges who are unsympathetic to the
plight of domestic violence victims and immigrants in general are free to
interpret the decision narrowly. Matter of A-R-C-G- represents progress
towards greater protection for domestic violence victims, but it does not
eliminate the confusion and inconsistency surrounding domestic violence
as a basis for asylum.  Without further action by the United States gov-
ernment, domestic violence victims’ fate remains precarious.
Part I of this Note discusses the general framework for granting asy-
lum in the United States and describes how courts and the BIA have
historically interpreted persecution stemming from membership to a
“particular social group” as a basis for asylum.  Part II analyzes the case
law building up to Matter of A-R-C-G- and how victims of domestic
violence have come to be considered to belong to a “particular social
group.”  Part III argues that domestic violence is best understood as a
form of gender-based violence, placing it on equal ground with the other
bases of persecution within the U.S. definition of a refugee.  Part IV dis-
cusses the possible consequences of continuing to rely on the “particular
social group” framework as a basis for asylum in the context of domestic
violence and discusses three alternative approaches to achieving the goal
of protecting victims of domestic violence.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Brief History of U.S. Asylum Law
Until Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980 (the Act), the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1965 (the INA) governed the United
States’ refugee policy.  Until 1980, the definition of a refugee was ex-
tremely narrow: only those fleeing natural calamity or escaping from the
Middle East or Communist areas were entitled to enter the United States
as refugees.15  The Refugee Act of 1980 greatly expanded the United
States’ definition of a refugee to match the definition established by the
1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.16
The Act instituted a new definition that allowed refugees from any coun-
try, including refugees who had not yet fled their home country, who
could demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future per-
15 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 911, 913 (containing
restrictions).
16 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I,  July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267; Doris Meissner, Thirty Years of the Refugee Act of 1980, IIP DIGITAL (Sept. 21, 2010),
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/publication/2010/09/20100921144657aidan0.81003
97.html#axzz3GXf4twJZ.
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secution.  The Act also created a pathway to legal immigrant status to
those already present in the United States, also known as asylum.17  In
the three decades since the Act’s passage, more than three million immi-
grants have been granted protection as refugees or asylees.18  In fiscal
year 2012 alone, nearly 30,000 individuals were granted asylum.19
B. Framework for Granting Asylum
Under current U.S. law, to be granted asylum, a noncitizen must
meet the definition of a refugee set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  The
provision states in pertinent part:
(A) Any person who is outside any country of such per-
son’s nationality20 . . . and who is unable or unwilling to
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of per-
secution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.21
The framework for granting asylum is deceptively complex, with the pre-
cise definition of each term and element being primarily determined on a
case-by-case basis.  The term “persecution,” for example, is not ex-
pressly defined in the statute, regulations, or by the BIA, but through
case law has come to mean physical or emotional suffering or harm in-
flicted “without legitimate reason.”22  Another example of ambiguity
within the statutory definition of a refugee is what constitutes a “well-
founded fear” of persecution.  Because neither the BIA nor Congress de-
fined the phrase, this element also developed through case law.23  Even-
tually the Supreme Court held that “well-founded fear” of persecution is
17 Meissner, supra note 16. R
18 Id.
19 Asylum in the United States, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www
.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/asylum-united-states.
20 The definition of a refugee also allows people outside their home country to qualify as
refugees if the President carves out an exception for them.  Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2012).
21 INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (em-
phasis added).
22 See Sahi v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 587, 588–89 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that the BIA has
failed to define “persecution”); Topalli v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating that
because there is no statutory definition of “persecution,” the BIA determines “what amounts to
past persecution on a case-by-case basis”); Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332,
341 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[P]ersecution is the infliction of suffering of harm upon those who differ
on the basis of a protected statutory ground.”); De Souza v. INS, 999 F.2d 1156, 1158 (7th Cir.
1993) (“‘[P]ersecution’ . . . [is the] punishment of infliction of harm for . . . reasons that this
country does not recognize as legitimate.”).
23 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987) (acknowledging that the Court
must engage in gap filling where Congress has left a gap).
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a lower standard than “clear probability” of persecution—the standard
applied in a similar kind of relief known as “withholding of deporta-
tion.”24  The Court, however, acknowledged that the phrase is inherently
ambiguous and that the standard should be further clarified on a case-by-
case basis.25
To be granted asylum, the asylum seeker must have suffered perse-
cution “on account of” one of five enumerated categories: (1) race, (2)
religion, (3) nationality, (4) membership in a particular social group, or
(5) political opinion.26  The REAL ID Act of 2005 clarified that the pro-
tected ground must be “at least one central reason” for the persecution,
allowing the possibility of a persecutor with mixed motives.27  The BIA
and the statute left the five protected grounds to be defined on a case-by-
case basis.
C. BIA Framework for “Particular Social Group”
The category of “membership in a particular social group,” perhaps
the most amorphous and controversial of the five protected grounds,28 is
of particular importance in this Note.  As with the other enumerated
grounds, “particular social group” is not defined in the statute by the BIA
or by legislative history.29  Congress included the category to conform to
the definition of a refugee outlined in the U.N. Convention and Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, although the U.N. also left “particular
social group” undefined.30  Further, the category’s inclusion even in the
U.N. Protocol has been described as an “afterthought,” added in as a
catch-all provision.31
The definition of a “particular social group” that is currently em-
ployed by the BIA has developed through case law.32  The definition has
24 Id. at 431–32.
25 Id. at 448 (“There is obviously some ambiguity in a term like ‘well-founded fear’
which can only be given concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.”).
26 INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
27 INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
28 See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Both courts and commen-
tators have struggled to define ‘particular social group.’  Read in its broadest literal sense, the
phrase is almost completely open-ended.”); U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on
International Protection No. 2: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Con-
text of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines].
29 Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1238–39 (discussing the ambiguity of the phrase and the lack of
clarifying legislative history).
30 UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 28, ¶ 1.
31 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219
(1966).
32 See, e.g., Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985) (stating that the group
members must “share a common, immutable characteristic,” meaning something “beyond the
power of an individual to change, or . . . so fundamental to individual identity or conscience
that it ought not be required to be changed.”); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576
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solidified into a three-part test: to form the basis of an asylum claim, the
social group must be: (1) “composed of members who share a common
immutable characteristic,” (2) “socially distinct,” and (3) “defined with
particularity.”33
First, a particular social group’s members must “share a common,
immutable characteristic.”34  In this context, “immutable” refers to a
characteristic that is either “beyond the power of an individual to change
or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not
be required to be changed.”35  A voluntary relationship or association
between members is not considered to be immutable.36  In Matter of
Acosta, for example, the BIA held that members of a taxi driver’s associ-
ation who refused to participate in an anti-government work stoppage,
and who were targets of violence as a result, did not suffer persecution
on account of membership in a particular social group.  The BIA found
that the proposed group did not rest on an immutable characteristic37
because neither being a taxi driver nor refusing to participate in a
guerrilla-sponsored work stoppage “is immutable because the members
of the group could avoid the threats of the guerrillas either by changing
jobs or by cooperating in work stoppages.”38  The BIA found that an
occupation is not so fundamental to a person’s identity that it “ought not
be required to be changed.”39  The BIA determined that a particular so-
cial group required immutability in order to form the basis of an asylum
claim by applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis: where general words
are listed with specific words, courts should interpret the general words
to be consistent with the specific words.40  Because race, religion, nation-
ality, and political opinion all describe immutable characteristics, mem-
bership in a particular social group must also be an immutable
characteristic.41
Second, in order to form the basis of an asylum claim, the particular
social group must be “socially distinct.”42  This second element was orig-
inally conceived of as “social visibility,” which required that the society
in which the group existed perceive the individuals as members of the
(9th Cir. 1986) (“[T[he phrase ‘particular social group’ implies a collection of people closely
affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some common impulse or interest.”).
33 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392 (B.I.A. 2014).
34 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
35 Id. at 233–34.
36 Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956–57 (B.I.A. 2006).
37 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 217.
38 Id. at 234.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 233.
41 Id.
42 Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 216 (B.I.A. 2014).
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group.43  The BIA found that wealthy Guatemalans, for example, lacked
social visibility because non-wealthy Guatemalans were also targeted for
extortion, the form of persecution the asylum applicants alleged.44  The
BIA has held, however, that Filipinos of mixed Filipino-Chinese ances-
try, former landowners, and people recorded as homosexual by the gov-
ernment are all sufficiently visible to others in society to constitute a
particular social group.45  In February 2014, however, the BIA renamed
the “social visibility” requirement to the now-used “social distinction”
requirement.46  The BIA renamed this element to correct the misinterpre-
tation that social visibility required literal or “ocular” visibility, and to
establish that social distinction is about perception by society rather than
identification on sight.47  To be socially distinct, the BIA held, an asylum
applicant must demonstrate that the society in which the group exists
“perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular char-
acteristic to be a group.”48 Society need not, however, be able to identify
which specific individuals belong to the group.49  In clarifying this point,
the BIA reaffirmed that individuals such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or
transgender (LGBT)-identified people or women who oppose female
genital mutilation, for example, constitute social groups even though it
would take effort to determine their status as group members.50  Further,
a social group must be perceived and recognized as such by the society
in which the group exists, and not just by the persecutors, since a social
group may not be defined based solely on the fact that the members have
been targeted or harmed.51
Lastly, particular social groups must be “particular.”  The BIA has
defined particularity as “whether the proposed group can accurately be
described in a manner sufficiently distinct that the group would be recog-
nized, in the society in question, as a discrete class of persons.”52  The
group must be discrete, have definable boundaries, and may not be sub-
jective, overbroad, or diffuse.53  The BIA and courts may consider the
size of the proposed social group to determine whether it is sufficiently
discrete.54  In determining particularity, the terms used to describe the
43 Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959-61 (B.I.A. 2006).
44 Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 75 (B.I.A. 2007).
45 C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960.
46 W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 212 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec.
227, 239 (B.I.A. 2014).
47 W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 216.
48 Id. at 217.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 218.
52 Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 584.
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group must have commonly accepted definitions within the society
where the group exists.55  In Matter of S-E-G-, for example, the BIA held
that one of the respondents failed to demonstrate membership in a partic-
ular social group because he could not concretely describe the group
without resorting to terms about which reasonable minds could differ:
“male children who lack stable families and meaningful adult protection,
who are from middle and low income classes, who live in the territories
controlled by the MS-13 gang, and who refuse recruitment.”56  The BIA
also held that the other respondent in Matter of S-E-G- belonged to a
social group that was too amorphous to be defined with sufficient partic-
ularity: “‘family members’ of Salvadoran youth who have been subjected
to recruitment efforts by MS-13 and who have rejected or resisted mem-
bership in the gang.”57  In this case, the BIA found the language of “fam-
ily member” to be overbroad and amorphous because it was not clear if
the term could encompass more distant relatives, such as grandparents,
aunts and uncles, cousins, or nieces and nephews.58
D. UNHCR Framework for “Particular Social Group”
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
employs a framework similar to that developed by the BIA, with several
important distinctions.  First, the UNHCR definition attempts to recon-
cile the requirement of immutability and the requirement of social per-
ception, acknowledging that the two approaches can lead to different
results when applied to the same facts.59  For example, a society might
recognize a social group based on social class or professional occupation,
which are not immutable characteristics in the sense of being unchange-
able or fundamental to human identity.60  As such, requiring immutabil-
ity in order to find a particular social group would not allow asylum to
persons perceived as members of a group rooted in social class or occu-
pation.  By contrast, requiring only social perception to define a particu-
lar social group would allow such persons to be granted asylum based on
their membership.  The BIA requires that a particular social group be
both socially distinct as well as rooted in an immutable shared character-
istic.  By contrast, the UNHCR definition only requires that the particular
social group be either comprised of persons who share a common char-
acteristic or be perceived as a particular group by society.61  The
UNHCR does not mandate that the shared characteristic be immutable,
55 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239 (B.I.A. 2014).
56 S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. at 585.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 28, ¶ 10. R
60 Id. ¶ 9.
61 Id. ¶ 11.
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though the definition admits that the characteristic will often be “innate,
unchangeable, or . . . otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or
the exercise of one’s human rights.”62  Second, unlike the BIA definition,
the UNHCR definition does not require a claimant to allege a social
group with sufficient particularity.  The UNHCR definition could also be
interpreted as rejecting the requirement of particularity, given that it ex-
pressly states that the size of the proposed social group is not a relevant
factor when determining if a particular social group exists.63  Conversely,
the BIA definition does consider the relative size of the proposed social
group when determining if a particular social group exists.64
The UNHCR definition sets a lower threshold for demonstrating
persecution based on membership in a particular social group.  A claim-
ant need only propose a social group that is rooted in immutability or
societal perception, and need not address particularity.  This means that
many asylum seekers who would qualify for asylum under the UNHCR
definition would be denied asylum in the United States.  For example,
under the UNHCR definition, a person’s occupation could form the basis
of a particular social group if society perceives that occupation as a so-
cial group, whereas it would fail under the BIA’s definition for lack of
immutability.65  From a humanitarian perspective, the UNHCR definition
is better because of its expansive nature.  From an anti-immigration per-
spective, however, the BIA’s definition is preferable in that it requires
asylum-seekers to meet more stringent requirements, and will permit
fewer people to claim asylum under the amorphous definition of a partic-
ular social group.
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A SOCIAL GROUP
A. Early Treatment of Domestic Violence As a Social Group
Before Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, the United States’
definition of a refugee was so narrow that claiming asylum status based
on being a victim of domestic violence would have been inconceivable.66
The United States lacked any policy regarding domestic violence as a
basis for claiming asylum until 1995, when the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service (INS) issued guidelines addressing the issue of gender
violence.67  The guidelines were directed towards the INS Asylum Of-
62 Id.
63 Id. ¶ 18.
64 Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008).
65 Compare Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 217 (B.I.A. 1985), with UNHCR
Guidelines, supra note 28, ¶ 13. R
66 Compare Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, §?3, 79 Stat. 911, 913 (containing
restrictions), with Immigration Act of 1990, 101 Pub. L. No. 649, 104 Stat. 4978.
67 Phyllis Coven, Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from
Women, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 26, 1995), http://www.state.gov/s/l/65633.htm.
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ficer Corps and attempted to improve “uniformity and consistency in
procedures and decisions.”68  The guidelines stated that although gender
alone could not constitute membership in a particular social group, wo-
men who have experienced domestic violence might have an asylum
claim based on those experiences.69  These guidelines, however, did not
bind the BIA or any court.70
The BIA decided Matter of Kasinga in 1996, a year after the INS
issued its gender guidelines.  The decision officially opened the door to
allowing domestic violence to form the basis of a particular social
group.71  However, Matter of Kasinga did not specifically address the
issue of domestic violence as a basis for an asylum claim.  Rather, the
case concerned a Togolese woman who fled her home country to escape
being forced to undergo female genital mutilation (FGM).72  Once in the
United States, the woman claimed asylum on the basis that she faced
persecution on account of her membership in a particular social group.73
The BIA framed the particular social group as “young women of the
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that
tribe, and who oppose the practice.”74  The BIA interpreted Matter of
Acosta, which held that a characteristic defining a particular social group
must be immutable or fundamental, to mean that a particular social group
could be formed around gender, so long as the group was defined by
gender along with another characteristic.75  In this case, the BIA held that
the characteristics of being a young woman who is also a member of the
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe and who has intact genitalia were immuta-
ble.76  The BIA also found that the woman met the other requirements
for claiming asylum, and officially granted asylum based on her mem-
bership in a particular social group.77
B. Matter of R-A-
In 1999, the BIA decided Matter of R-A-,78 which changed the tra-
jectory of how the United States considers asylum applicants whose per-
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 Case
Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 112
(2013).
71 Id. at 112–13.
72 Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358–59 (B.I.A. 1996).
73 Id. at 359.
74 Id. at 365.
75 Id. at 365–66; Bookey, supra note 70, at 112–13. R
76 Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 366.
77 Id. at 370.
78 Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 2001).
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secution takes the form of domestic violence.79  The BIA denied asylum
to a Guatemalan woman who had suffered severe abuse at the hands of
her former-military husband, and who had been denied assistance by the
Guatemalan legal system.  The BIA held that the asylum applicant, Rodi
Alvarado, had not met her burden of proof to show that her persecution
was based on one of the statutorily protected grounds.80  Specifically, the
BIA held that although the circumstances surrounding Alvarado’s abuse
rose to the level of persecution, Alvarado was not persecuted because of
her membership in a particular social group.81
The facts of the case are disturbing.  Alvarado described in great
detail the constant and severe sexual and physical abuse she suffered at
the hands of her husband, beginning almost immediately after she and
her husband married.82  Her husband justified the abuse by saying that
because she was his wife, she was his property and he could treat her
however he wished.83  Alvarado made several attempts to escape from
her husband, even including fleeing to another city.84  Nevertheless, her
husband always found her and brought her back home, where he contin-
ued to abuse her.85  On several different occasions, the Guatemalan po-
lice failed to intervene after Alvarado reported the abuse.86  On one
occasion, a Guatemalan judge expressly told Alvarado that he would not
interfere in a domestic dispute because it was a private matter.87  In May
1995, Alvarado fled Guatemala to Brownsville, Texas, where she filed
an asylum application.88
An immigration judge found that Alvarado had suffered harm rising
to the level of persecution and that the Guatemalan government was un-
willing or unable to prevent the persecution.89  The immigration judge
further held that Alvarado’s persecution was on account of her member-
ship in the particular social group of “Guatemalan women who have
been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who be-
lieve that women are to live under male domination.”90  The immigration
judge then found that the social group, as defined, met the required level
of cohesion, immutability, and particularity.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 925.
82 Id. at 908.
83 Id. at 908–09.
84 Id. at 908–09.
85 Id. at 909.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 911.
90 Id.
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On review, the BIA agreed that the severity of the harm inflicted on
Alvarado was sufficient to constitute persecution, and that the Guatema-
lan government had demonstrated itself to be unwilling or unable to pre-
vent her persecution.91  The BIA also held, however, that the
immigration judge had erred in concluding that Alvarado was harmed on
account of her membership in a particular social group.92  The BIA
stated that it seemed the social group Alvarado presented had been de-
fined for the purposes of the asylum case and not because Guatemalan
society actually perceived the group, as defined, to exist.93  The BIA
conceded it was possible to show immutability, but held the group lacked
social distinction because the group was not perceived as such by Guate-
malan society, by the members themselves, or by the persecutors.94  The
BIA further held that, even assuming for the sake of argument that Alva-
rado belonged to a particular social group of abused Guatemalan women,
her claim failed for lack of nexus.95  As the BIA interpreted the facts,
Alvarado’s husband was violent towards her because she was his wife,
not because Alvarado belonged to a class of women that were intimate
with abusive partners.96
The BIA also rejected the immigration judge’s finding that the Gua-
temalan police’s failure to protect her constituted state-sanctioned
spousal abuse, since there was no evidence suggesting that spousal abuse
was considered desirable in Guatemala or that the government actively
condoned such abuse.97  The BIA denied Alvarado’s asylum claim, find-
ing that she failed to meet the required criteria of a refugee because she
did not belong to a particular social group and if she had, that she was
not persecuted on account of her membership in that group.98
Matter of R-A- was not groundbreaking in the sense that the BIA’s
analysis of particular social groups in the context of domestic violence
changed course from that of previous BIA decisions.  Rather, what is
significant about Matter of R-A- is the aftermath, which marked a clear
shift in U.S. policy regarding asylum applicants fleeing from domestic
violence.  Because the facts in Matter of R-A- were so shocking, the deci-
sion to deny Alvarado asylum caused public outrage and calls by politi-
cians to overturn the BIA decision.99  In 2001, Attorney General Janet
91 Id. at 914.
92 Id. at 914, 918.
93 Id. at 918.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 920.
96 Id. at 921.
97 Id. at 922–23.
98 Id. at 925.
99 Bookey, supra note 70, at 114; Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard Urges Attorney R
General Ashcroft to Help Women Who Are Victims of Domestic Violence Obtain Asylum in the
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Reno vacated the decision and then proposed regulations to officially
include certain victims of domestic violence in the definition of a partic-
ular social group.100  Attorney General Reno remanded the case to the
BIA to reconsider it once the INS finalized the regulations.101  By 2003,
however, the regulations still had not been finalized, and Attorney Gen-
eral John Ashcroft re-certified Matter of R-A- to himself, requesting
briefing on the subject.102  Women’s rights groups and pro-immigrant
advocates feared Attorney General Ashcroft would reject the proposed
regulations.103  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) submitted
a comprehensive 43-page brief arguing that “married women in Guate-
mala who are unable to leave the relationship” constitutes a particular
social group, and satisfies all three required elements.104  Despite these
steps, in 2005, the Attorney General again remanded the case pending
finalization of the regulations.105  Ultimately, the regulations were never
finalized.
In 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey issued an opinion lift-
ing the stay and remanding the case for further proceedings in accor-
dance with the guidelines laid out in the opinion.106  Mukasey granted
the BIA permission to rule on Matter of R-A- and similar pending cases
involving domestic violence without waiting for the finalized regulations
as guidance, and expressly granted the BIA permission to exercise its
discretion in setting a national standard regarding domestic violence as
the basis for forming a particular social group.107  On remand, the immi-
gration judge granted Alvarado asylum, but the decision applied only to
her case and was not precedential.108
C. Matter of L-R-
While Matter of R-A- awaited the immigration judge’s determina-
tion, the BIA considered another domestic violence case: Matter of L-R-.
In response to the BIA’s request for briefing, DHS filed another brief
United States, LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD (Nov. 5, 2003), http://roybal-allard.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=129871.
100 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codi-
fied at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208); R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 906.
101 R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 906.
102 Dep’t of Homeland Security’s Position on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief at 437,
Matter of Rodi Alvarado-Pena, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (B.I.A. 2004) (No. A 73 753 922) [herein-
after DHS Brief on R-A-].
103 See Patrick J. McDonnell, Domestic Abuse Reviewed as Basis for Political Asylum,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, at A16.
104 DHS Brief on R-A-, supra note 102, at 27. R
105 Id.
106 Matter of R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629, 630 (B.I.A. 2008).
107 Id. at 631.
108 Bookey, supra note 70, at 117; Fleeing Abuse, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2009), http:// R
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/09/AR2009110903163_pf.html.
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supporting domestic violence as a basis for membership in a particular
social group.109 Matter of L-R- involved a young Mexican woman, raped
by her school’s sports coach and forced into a nearly twenty-year-long
relationship with him marked by repeated rape, beatings, and mental tor-
ment.110  When L-R- turned to the state for protection, she faced further
victimization: the judge assigned to her case refused to help her unless
she had sex with him, and when she rejected his offer, he told her she
was a bad mother for not being willing to do anything to protect her
children.111  Like Rodi Alvarado, L-R- made several unsuccessful at-
tempts to flee her abuser before finally escaping to the United States with
her children.  The DHS rejected the proposed social group (“Mexican
women in an abusive domestic relationship who are unable to leave”) as
circular,112 instead suggesting either “Mexican women in domestic rela-
tionships who are unable to leave” or “Mexican women who are viewed
as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship.”113
As in Matter of R-A-, the immigration judge granted L-R- asylum in a
non-precedential decision.114
D. Matter of A-R-C-G-
In August 2014, the BIA finally issued a precedential decision ad-
dressing the question of domestic violence victims as a particular social
group: Matter of A-R-C-G-.  The facts are nearly identical to those in
Matter of R-A-.  In both cases, the respondent was a Guatemalan mother
who fled to the United States to escape horrific domestic abuse.115  Like
Rodi Alvarado, the respondent in Matter of A-R-C-G- endured sexual
violence and regular beatings at the hands of her husband.  Although she
made several attempts to flee to other cities in Guatemala, her husband
always found her and brought her back home, where the abuse
continued.116
The immigration judge denied the respondent’s asylum claim, find-
ing that she did not demonstrate that her abuse was because of her be-
longing to any particular social group.”117  On appeal, the BIA reversed
and remanded the case.  In doing so, the BIA held that the abuse the
109 Dep’t of Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief, Matter of L-R- (B.I.A. Apr. 13,
2009), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf
[hereinafter DHS Brief on L-R-].
110 Impact Litigation: Matter of L-R-, CTR. FOR REFUGEE STUDIES, http://cgrs.uchastings
.edu/our-work/matter-l-r (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
111 Id.
112 DHS Brief on L-R-, supra note 109, at 10. R
113 Id. at 14–15.
114 See Impact Litigation: Matter of L-R-, supra note 110. R
115 See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 389–90.
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respondent suffered did, in fact, rise to the level of persecution and that
the particular social group she asserted as a basis for persecution was
valid.118  In this case, the proposed particular social group comprised of
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relation-
ship.”119  In making the determination that the proposed particular social
group was valid, the BIA applied the three-part framework developed in
Matter of W-G-R- and Matter of M-E-V-G-: “[A]n applicant seeking asy-
lum based on his or her membership in a ‘particular social group’ must
establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a com-
mon immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) so-
cially distinct within the society in question.”120
The BIA established that the respondent had met her burden of es-
tablishing all three elements of the test, but remanded for the immigra-
tion judge to consider if the respondent met her burden of showing that
the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect her from
persecution.121
First, the BIA found that the proposed particular social group that
formed the basis of the respondent’s claim was comprised of members
who share a common immutable characteristic—gender.122  The BIA
opinion was remarkably terse in developing its reasoning, and merely
stated that both sex and marital status when the person is not able to
leave the relationship are immutable characteristics, citing Matter of
Acosta and Matter of W-G-R- without more.123  The opinion also gave
little guidance for how other judges should analyze these issues in the
future.  The BIA stated that a “range of factors” ought to be considered
in light of the country-specific circumstances and the asylum-seeker’s
own subjective experiences.124  The only example given in the opinion,
however, was how realistically possible divorce would be, given the
country and the respondent’s “religious, cultural, or legal restraints.”125
Besides this one example, the BIA did not further develop its reasoning
for determining that the characteristics at issue in this case were suffi-
ciently immutable.
Second, the BIA found that the proposed group was defined with
sufficient particularity. This part of the opinion was similarly thin, and
appeared to turn largely on the fact that the Department of Homeland
118 Id. at 390.
119 Id. at 392.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 395.
122 Id. at 392.
123 Id. at 392–93.
124 Id. at 393.
125 Id.
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Security (DHS) conceded this point.126  The BIA stated that the terms
used to define the group (“married,” “women,” and “unable to leave the
relationship”) “have commonly accepted definitions within Guatemalan
society based on the facts in this case.”127  To support this assertion, the
BIA cited as support only Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-,
neither of which involve domestic violence or gender-based violence.128
The opinion again did not offer much guidance for future domestic vio-
lence-based asylum claims on the question of particularity.  The BIA of-
fers that “in some circumstances,” being a married woman unable to
leave the relationship “can combine to create a group with discrete and
definable boundaries.”129  The BIA failed, however, to describe what cir-
cumstances might give rise to sufficient particularity beyond acknowl-
edging that the BIA found significant that the police refused to intervene
to protect the respondent from spousal abuse.130
Third, the BIA found that the group was sufficiently “socially dis-
tinct” within Guatemalan society.131  In support of this finding, the BIA
considered evidence that, although Guatemala has laws in place to pro-
tect victims of domestic violence, the police often do not intervene in
domestic disputes to enforce those laws.132  The opinion especially re-
ferred to the DHS report that conceded that Guatemala has a culture of
“machismo and family violence” and that spousal rape and abuse are
serious problems that are not being adequately addressed by the National
Civilian Police.133  The BIA then offered some guidance for future cases,
stating that social distinction turns on the specific facts and evidence in
each country’s conditions, including law enforcement practices in the do-
mestic violence context, as well as the statistics and expert witnesses
offered.134  While the opinion purports to shed light on how immigration
judges should assess domestic violence-based claims, this guidance is
vague.  The BIA appears to rely heavily on the DHS’s own report con-
ceding these points, so it remains unclear what other types of “statistics
and expert witnesses,”135 short of the DHS itself, would be sufficiently
credible and persuasive support of granting asylum in the domestic vio-
lence context.
126 Id. (“The DHS concedes that the group in this case is defined with particularity.”).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 394.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 394–95.
135 Id.
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On the issue of nexus, the DHS also conceded that the abuse the
respondent suffered rose to the level of persecution and that her member-
ship in a particular social group “was at least one central reason” for the
abuse.136  Again, the BIA rested its conclusion on the DHS’s concession,
and did not further develop its reasoning for how the respondent’s abuse
was on account of her being a part of a class of “married women in
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.”137  The BIA also
stated that where the DHS has not made a binding concession, such as in
Matter of A-R-C-G-, the immigration judge would need to assess the
facts and evidence on a case-by-case basis.  The BIA did not, however,
offer any guidance about which points the BIA found persuasive in this
case.  Further, the opinion did not address which factors immigration
judges should consider important, merely stating that the “issue of nexus
will depend on the facts and circumstances of an individual claim.”138
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS GENDER PERSECUTION
Thus far, this Note has discussed how domestic violence as a basis
for an asylum claim has developed in the United States since Congress
passed the Refugee Act of 1980.  In particular, this Note has analyzed
how victims of domestic violence have come to be considered as falling
under the umbrella category of a particular social group.  What must also
be considered, as a question of public policy, is whether victims of do-
mestic violence should be protected as persecuted members of a particu-
lar social group.
This Note argues that victims of domestic violence should be pro-
tected under current asylum law following the logic and principles be-
hind the U.S. asylum policy.  First, as a general point, victims of
domestic violence are a vulnerable population and the United States has
a moral obligation to provide a safe haven for people who are being
victimized in their home country.  Second, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, both the UNHCR and U.S. refugee law share the same common
goal of protecting vulnerable populations who are targeted for possessing
an immutable or socially-recognized characteristic.139  This Note argues
that domestic violence is best understood as a form of gender-based vio-
lence.  That is, that victims of domestic violence are persecuted because
of their gender, and should therefore fall under the shared goal of the
UNHCR and U.S. definitions of a refugee: to shelter those persecuted for
136 Id.
137 Id. at 392.
138 Id. at 395.
139 See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012); INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158; UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 28, ¶ R
11.
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possessing a socially recognized and140 immutable trait such as race, re-
ligion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.141
Studies completed by feminist scholars and international human
rights organizations support this Note’s assertion that domestic violence
should be understood as a form of gender-based violence. Feminist
scholarship understands domestic violence not as an isolated act between
private actors, but rather as part of a broader societal conception of ap-
propriate gender roles.  Gloria Steinem famously discussed the necessary
role of violence and threat of violence in the perpetuation of patriarchic
systems, stating that “the most dangerous situation for a woman is not an
unknown man in the street, or even the enemy in wartime, but a husband
or lover in the isolation of their own home.”142  Feminist scholars assert
that domestic violence is consistently used as a tool to subordinate and
control women due to a desire to maintain male dominance within soci-
ety.143  Meaning, more generally, domestic violence is a tool to maintain
patriarchy on a large scale.  For example, Rhonda Copelon has described
how domestic violence is born out of a systemic problem of patriarchy
within society, with domestic violence arising out of “a mechanism of
patriarchal control of women that is built upon male superiority and fe-
male inferiority, sex-stereotyped roles and expectations, and the eco-
nomic, social and political predominance of men and dependency of
women.”144
To support these claims, feminist scholars draw on studies con-
ducted by organizations like the United Nations and the World Health
Organization (WHO).  For example, the United Nations has found a con-
nection between domestic violence and women being viewed as
subordinate within a society.145  An extensive, multinational study com-
pleted by the WHO in 2005 further supports this connection.  For exam-
ple, the WHO study found a link between high rates of domestic violence
and communities where traditional beliefs encouraged the idea that sub-
140 In the case of the UNHCR definition, this should read “socially recognized or immuta-
ble.” See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 28, ¶ 11. R
141 INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
142 GLORIA STEINEM, REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN: A BOOK OF SELF-ESTEEM 259–61
(1993).
143 Jessica Marsden, Domestic Violence Asylum After Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE L.J.
2512, 2519 (2014) (synthesizing in great detail the body of feminist scholarship portraying
domestic violence as a tool of perpetuating patriarchy).
144 Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as
Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 305 (1994).
145 Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century,
June 5–9, 2000, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the Twenty-Third Special
Session of the General Assembly, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/S-23/10/Rev.1 (2000).
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ordination of women is normal.146  As such, the WHO study advocates
for the promotion of gender equality as a way to directly reduce the inci-
dence of domestic violence within a society: “Improving women’s legal
and socioeconomic status is likely to be, in the long term, a key interven-
tion in reducing women’s vulnerability to violence.”147
While domestic violence occurs in same-sex partnerships and do-
mestic violence can be perpetrated by women against their male part-
ners,148 it is still helpful to think of domestic violence as being gender-
based persecution.  Although men can and do suffer abuse from female
partners, according to the WHO study cited above, the vast majority of
domestic violence cases involve men abusing their female partners.149
The discussion of this point is not meant to diminish the experiences of
domestic violence suffered by men or by women in same-sex partner-
ships.  Factors besides entrenched misogyny may contribute to domestic
violence, especially when suffered by men or by female-partnered wo-
men; for example, one study suggests that stress or tension may lead to
partner violence.150  Acknowledging these important nuances, this Note
draws attention to the overwhelming trend of male-on-female violence in
order to clarify that while there are other reasons for partner violence,
female victimization by their male partners is likely rooted in gender
hierarchy.  Given the high rates of male-on-female partner violence, for
asylum purposes, there should be a presumption that male-on-female
partner violence is perpetrated within a system of gender hierarchy.
Because of the connection between domestic violence and a sys-
temic attempt to maintain female subordination, male-on-female domes-
tic violence should be presumed to be persecution on account of gender.
U.S. asylum law is meant to protect people from persecution based on
their possession of immutable and socially perceived traits.151  Gender
should be considered on par with the currently enumerated traits of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and politi-
cal opinion.  As defined through U.S. case law, immutability has come to
mean a characteristic that is “either beyond the power of an individual to
change or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it
146 Claudia Garcı´a-Moreno et al., WHO Multi-Country Study on Women’s Health and
Domestic Violence Against Women, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 84–85 (2005), http://www.who.int/
reproductivehealth/publications/violence/24159358X/en/.
147 Id. at 90.
148 NAT’L COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS-
GENDER, QUEER, AND HIV-AFFECTED INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN 2013, at 17 (2014),
http://www.avp.org/storage/documents/ncavp2013ipvreport_webfinal.pdf.
149 Garcı´a-Moreno et al., supra note 146, at 36–39. R
150 ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT, at xi (2004).
151 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(2012); INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
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ought not to be required to be changed.”152 Although medical advance-
ments now allow for physical transition, gender should be considered an
immutable trait because it is fundamental to individual identity, such that
it ought not to be required to be changed, as held in Matter of Acosta.153
Gender is also a socially perceived characteristic.  Across societies, gen-
der is recognized and humans are categorized based on their perceived
gender identity.  Even cultures that do not subscribe to the male-female
gender binary found in Western cultures, and instead recognize more
than two genders, still categorize humans based on gender.154  As such,
because gender is an immutable and socially perceived trait, and because
domestic violence is inextricably linked to gender, U.S. asylum law
should protect victims of domestic violence who can demonstrate the
other required elements of an asylum claim.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
As discussed above, this Note asserts that domestic violence should
be considered a form of gender-based persecution, and therefore victims
of domestic violence that meet the additional required criteria should be
protected by U.S. asylum law.  Part IV addresses various methods for
how the United States can best protect victims of domestic violence
seeking asylum.  Specifically, this Note addresses how the United States
should rectify the confusion discussed above if it hopes to achieve the
important goal of protecting women and children from domestic vio-
lence.  While women’s advocacy groups and human rights activists cele-
brated the BIA’s decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- as a step forward
towards this end,155 this Note argues that the decision left much to clarify
regarding the BIA’s position on domestic violence-based asylum claims.
This Note also argues that confusion and inconsistency will continue to
reign in this area of asylum law without legislative or regulatory inter-
vention to resolve the tensions inherent to domestic violence as an asy-
lum claim under the current U.S. system.
Section A addresses the consequences of maintaining the status quo
and discusses why Matter of A-R-C-G-’s impact is not as far-reaching as
some hoped.  Section B explores a regulatory approach to resolving these
issues, analyzing the probably limited impact of finalizing the 2001 pro-
posed regulations and discussing Jessica Marsden’s proposed change to
the regulations.  Section C discusses a legislative approach, and advo-
152 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233–34 (B.I.A. 1985).
153 Id. at 233.
154 Evan B. Towle & Lynn Marie Morgan, Romancing the Transgender Native: Rethink-
ing the Use of the “Third Gender” Concept, 8 GLQ 469, 469–70 (2002) (criticizing Western
anthropologists’ understanding and interpretation of third genders, but providing overview of
cultures with non-binary gender structures).
155 See, e.g., Grenier, supra note 14. R
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cates for adding gender as a standalone basis of persecution under the
U.S. definition of a refugee.
A. Consequences of Status Quo
Matter of A-R-C-G- represents a small step forward because the de-
cision officially recognizes domestic violence as a basis for asylum and
binds all DHS officers and immigration judges.  The decision serves to
legitimize domestic violence as a basis for asylum and formally opens
the possibility for more women to be eligible to seek protection within
U.S. borders.  Despite this progress, however, the scope and impact of
the decision is not likely to be as dramatic as some hoped.
First, the BIA’s narrow holding is unlikely to open the floodgates to
all victims of domestic violence.  Because Matter of A-R-C-G-’s facts
closely mirror those of Matter of R-A-, the scope of the decision so far
only narrowly applies to married women from Guatemala who exper-
ienced domestic abuse so severe it approaches the level of torture.  As
case law develops, immigration judges could continue to expand the
holding to include women from other countries, unmarried women, and
women whose abuse does not exactly parallel the abuse suffered by Rodi
Alvarado and the asylum-seeker in Matter of A-R-C-G-.  Just as easily,
however, immigration judges could interpret the holding narrowly and
refuse to extend asylum to victims of domestic violence whose circum-
stances differ from the facts in Matter of A-R-C-G-.
Disparities in how immigration judges treat asylum cases are well-
documented.156  Because many immigration judges were hesitant to
grant asylum to victims of domestic violence prior to the BIA’s decision,
those same judges are not likely to interpret Matter of A-R-C-G-
broadly.157  For example, in 2011, one immigration judge found that do-
mestic violence victims, as a group, are not visible in India because most
Indian victims do not seek assistance from the government.158  While a
binding BIA decision could override reservations about whether marital
status can be immutable, Matter of A-R-C-G- does not bind immigration
judges to grant asylum to women from other countries, who are unmar-
ried, or who experience different kinds of abuse.  In fact, since August,
immigration judges across the country have been divided in their inter-
pretation of the decision’s scope and reach.  While some immigration
judges have granted asylum in cases involving non-marital unions and
156 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-940, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM: SIG-
NIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND
JUDGES 7 (2008) (analyzing nearly 200,000 asylum decisions between 1994 and 2007).
157 Bookey, supra note 70, at 141–42 (describing immigration judges’ reasoning for de- R
nying domestic violence-based asylum claims).
158 Id. at 142.
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countries besides Guatemala,159 many other immigration judges have at-
tempted to limit the impact of Matter of A-R-C-G- through extremely
narrow application.160  For example, based on a sample of cases161 re-
viewed by the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies at the University
of California, Hastings, some immigration judges have denied asylum
based on immaterial factual distinctions: finding that women abused by a
domestic partner are ineligible for asylum because they are not married,
relying on unrealistic views of an abused woman’s ability to leave her
relationship, or even finding that domestic abuse lacks sufficient nexus to
membership in a particular social group.162  Thus, the limitations of the
decision are already becoming apparent.
Second, Matter of A-R-C-G- is only binding if not disturbed by the
Attorney General.  Although the facts of the case are sympathetic and a
decision to overturn the BIA would likely cause outrage among pro-im-
migration and women’s rights advocates, anti-immigration advocates
who have voiced concern over perceived leniency regarding immigrants
and border protection might applaud a decision to reverse Matter of A-R-
C-G-.  A conservative Attorney General, coming into office as early as
2017, could succumb to pressure to overturn the decision.  Given the
current political climate, a binding BIA decision is not a solid promise of
future expansion of asylum to all victims of domestic violence or even a
promise that domestic violence will remain a legitimate ground for seek-
ing asylum.
Third, Matter of A-R-C-G- is vulnerable to being overturned in fed-
eral court.  Although the BIA’s decision is binding, it is still subject to
judicial review.  Although the BIA’s decision will be given Chevron def-
erence,163 a federal court could find the BIA’s interpretation of the law to
be unreasonable for relying on circular logic that is contrary to prior un-
derstanding of particular social groups. Matter of A-R-C-G- relies on
circular logic in that it defines a particular social group in terms of its
persecution.  The BIA’s thin analysis does little to resolve the problem of
circularity, and in fact, the BIA does not acknowledge the problem at all.
159 Blaine Bookey, Gender-Based Asylum Post-Matter of A-R-C-G-: Evolving Standards
and Fair Application of the Law, 22 SW. J. INT’L LAW (forthcoming) (noting a non-preceden-
tial immigration judge decision in Cleveland, OH granting asylum to an abused Guatemalan
woman who was in a common law marriage).
160 See id.
161 The cases on file at the CGRS are only a subset of domestic violence asylum cases in
the United States, and are not necessarily representative of national trends.  Nevertheless, the
Center has already seen cases illustrating both types of interpretation of A-R-C-G- at an immi-
gration judge level.
162 See Bookey, supra note 159. R
163 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984)
(holding that when a court reviews an agency’s statutory interpretation, an agency’s attempt at
gap-filling will be overturned only if found to be unreasonable).
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The BIA’s analysis appears to rest almost exclusively on concessions
made by the DHS.
The BIA has consistently resisted this type of circular analysis.  In
Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, the BIA expressly held that “[A] social
group cannot be defined exclusively by the fact that its members have
been subjected to harm.”164  In Matter of R-A-, for example, the BIA
reasoned that Alvarado’s husband abused her because he was a cruel
man with a history of trauma and not because he actively sought to pun-
ish her for being an abused woman.165  Even the UNHCR definition of a
refugee, expansive as it is, expressly states that the particular social
group may not be formed around the fact that the group faces persecu-
tion, though persecution can illustrate social perception.166
If some federal courts overturned Matter of A-R-C-G- and a circuit
split developed, some asylum officers would no longer be bound by the
BIA’s decision.  Where a federal circuit conflicts with the BIA, the asy-
lum officer is bound by the law the circuit court applies.167  Thus, vic-
tims of domestic violence in those circuits would not be able to seek
asylum on those grounds in those circuits until the U.S. Supreme Court
intervened to resolve the split.
Because Matter of A-R-C-G- is narrowly held and vulnerable to be-
ing overruled, women who hope to base their asylum claims on domestic
violence cannot adequately predict how their claims will be treated.
While many people who hope to claim asylum in the United States face
uncertainty, victims of domestic violence face unique risks.  Women who
leave their abusive partners are much more likely to be killed or severely
punished for attempting to leave.168  Further, because domestic violence
as a grounds for asylum has such limited case law, the level of unpredict-
ability for these women is higher than for a political dissident or an eth-
nic minority, who can rely on more established case law.
B. Regulatory Approach
As discussed above, due to the public outcry following Matter of R-
A-, Attorney General Janet Reno vacated the BIA’s decision, drafted reg-
ulations clarifying that domestic violence can serve as a basis for asylum,
and remanded Matter of R-A- for reconsideration pending the regula-
164 Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (B.I.A. 2007).
165 Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 921 (B.I.A. 2001).
166 UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 28, ¶ 14. R
167 Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www
.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm.
168 See Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger: Separation Vio-
lence as a Basis for Refugee Protection for Battered Women, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 348–51
(2009) (describing the increased likelihood of spousal murder where the woman no longer
resides with her abusive husband).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-2\CJP206.txt unknown Seq: 25 20-APR-16 12:23
2015] DOES MATTER OF A-R-C-G- MATTER THAT MUCH? 551
tions’ finalization.169  The proposed regulations, however, were never fi-
nalized.  One possible solution for clarifying the question of how to treat
domestic violence-based asylum claims is to finalize the proposed regu-
lations.  As this section explains, however, finalization of the proposed
regulations would be a step in the direction of more clarity and predict-
ability, but would not resolve the broader problems of applying the par-
ticular social group framework to domestic violence in this way.
The proposed regulations aim to provide guidance on what can be
considered persecution and membership in a particular social group, and
in particular, attempt to clarify the United States’ position on domestic
abuse and gender violence in the asylum context.170  The proposed regu-
lations admit that the category of membership in a particular social group
is the murkiest of the bases for asylum, and acknowledge that this confu-
sion has led to inconsistent outcomes.171  To clarify this point, the pro-
posed regulations expressly allow for “case-by-case adjudication of
claims based on domestic violence and other serious harm” and unequiv-
ocally state that gender may form the basis of a particular social
group.172  The regulations decline to take a bright-line stance on when
domestic violence can give rise to asylum claims, leaving judges to eval-
uate the facts in each case, relying on their own experiences and interpre-
tation of the facts at issue.173  In fact, the proposed regulations expressly
state that the DOJ was not “announcing a categorical rule that a victim of
domestic violence is or can be a refugee on account of that experience of
fear, or that persons presenting such claims may be found eligible for
relief or granted relief as a matter of discretion.”174
Aside from attempting to clarify that domestic violence and gender
can serve as a basis for membership in a particular social group, the
proposed regulations also try to resolve the issue of nexus.  First, the
regulations state that a persecutor may only have one target, and need not
harm other members belonging to the same particular social group: “evi-
dence that the persecutor seeks to act against other individuals who share
the applicant’s protected characteristic is relevant and may be considered
but shall not be required.”175  This language is specifically meant to ac-
commodate domestic violence and the problem that individual abusers
typically only target their partner and not other women with whom they
169 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codi-
fied at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208); R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 906.
170 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,589.
171 Id. (referring to membership as “the least well-defined of the five grounds within the
refugee definition”).
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 76,595.
175 Id. at 76,598.
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have no relationship.176  The proposed regulations would also allow “pat-
terns of violence” to satisfy the nexus requirement.177  These clarifica-
tions, however, do not actually address the issue of circularity—that
victims of domestic violence are not abused because they are abused.  In
effect, the regulations merely function as permission for judges to set
aside the fact that persecutors do not abuse their victims on account of
their victims being “married Guatemalan women who are unable to leave
the relationship.”178
Although the proposed regulations do not resolve the issue of circu-
lar logic, finalizing the regulations would be another small step in the
right direction, and would protect more women than Matter of A-R-C-G-
would alone.  First, the proposed regulations have a broader and more
general application than the BIA decision.  For example, Matter of A-R-
C-G- only expressly applies to married women, but the proposed regula-
tions contemplate how any intimate relationship could become an immu-
table trait if the victim could not reasonably be expected to leave.179  The
proposed regulations also expand the possibility of granting asylum
where the details of the abuse or the context in which the abuse takes
place differs from that of Matter of R-A- or Matter of A-R-C-G- by ex-
pressly leaving room for broad interpretation.180  The proposed regula-
tions also take an expansive approach to determining whether a
government has shown it is unable or unwilling to protect the victims,181
while the BIA decision would only expressly protect women whose cir-
cumstances parallel those detailed in Matter of R-A- or Matter of A-R-C-
G-.  Because of the more expansive language and clear intent to allow
asylum to be granted to women who suffer from domestic abuse, even
where the facts depart from those in Matter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of
R-A-, the proposed regulations are more stable and allow for more pre-
dictability.  By codifying an expansive approach to interpreting particular
social group membership in a domestic violence context, the regulations
are more likely to result in immigration judges and DHS officials apply-
ing an expansive approach.  A narrow BIA holding is easier to distin-
guish than a broad regulation.
Second, the proposed regulations are more difficult to change than a
rule hinged on a single BIA decision.  A hostile Attorney General, fed-
eral judge, or future BIA is unlikely to overturn a BIA decision outright,
just as a hostile Attorney General is unlikely to amend finalized regula-
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392 (B.I.A. 2014).
179 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,593.
180 Id. at 76,589.
181 Id. at 76,591 (stating that a variety of factors should be considered to determine if the
government is “unable or unwilling to protect” the victim).
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tions.  However, because the BIA’s decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- is
narrow and hinges on the particular facts of the case, subsequent rulings
by immigration judges, federal judges, or the BIA itself could effectively
gut Matter of A-R-C-G- and prevent other victims of domestic violence
from claiming asylum.  The language in the proposed regulations ex-
presses a clear intent to take an expansive approach to domestic violence
as a basis for asylum.182  Once finalized, restricting the scope of the reg-
ulations would require more purposeful action than a narrow holding ap-
plying Matter of A-R-C-G-, which leaves open the question of how
broadly the BIA intended the holding to be applied.
While finalizing Attorney General Reno’s proposed regulations
would expand the scope and permanence of the BIA’s holding in Matter
of A-R-C-G-, more drastic measures would be necessary to firmly cement
domestic violence into the U.S. asylum framework.  A giant leap that
eliminates the circular logic built into both the BIA’s decision and the
proposed regulations could improve predictability and stability.  A solu-
tion explored by Jessica Marsden is to amend the regulations to expressly
state that when determining eligibility for asylum:
(a) a social group defined solely by the gender of its
members is cognizable as a particular social group; and
(b) where a woman has experienced intimate-partner vi-
olence that otherwise meets the standard for persecution,
the victim’s gender shall be deemed to be one central
reason for the persecution.183
This proposal would root domestic violence-based asylum claims in gen-
der, eliminating the need for circular logic while at the same time ex-
panding protection to women facing gender-related persecution.184
Because gender is expressly allowed to serve as the basis for an asylum
claim, and domestic violence is expressly considered to be gender-based
persecution, there requires no logical leap to grant asylum.  As defined in
Marsden’s proposal, the persecution suffered is, as a matter of law, on
account of gender, which is now an acceptable basis to claim member-
ship in a particular social group.  Marsden’s proposal differs from Attor-
ney General Reno’s proposed regulations because while the proposed
regulations refused to “announce a categorical rule that a victim of do-
mestic violence is or can be a refugee on account of that experience,”185
Marsden’s proposed regulation would codify such a rule.
182 Id. at 76,589 (“This proposed rule removes certain barriers . . . to claims that domestic
violence . . . rises to the level of persecution of a person on account of membership in a
particular social group.”).
183 Marsden, supra note 143, at 2544. R
184 Id. at 2546.
185 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,595.
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Marsden advocates for a regulatory approach over a legislative ap-
proach, arguing that regulatory changes are easier to pass than are legis-
lative changes.  Marsden cites the success of the amendment made in
1996 in response to the one-child rule in China, which expressly added
forced abortions and sterilizations to fit under the category of persecution
on account of a political opinion.186  The 1996 amendment expressly
states that forced abortions and sterilizations are considered persecution,
and that forced abortions and sterilizations are considered on account of
a political opinion for the purposes of asylum determinations.187  Mars-
den asserts that this amendment was able to be passed due to the wide-
spread support from the anti-abortion movement and the political climate
at the time that galvanized Congress to act together to make the
change.188  By contrast, Marsden expresses doubt that in the current po-
litical climate it would be possible to unite Congress around the issue of
domestic violence.  This is because, Marsden argues, domestic violence
is less likely to galvanize a united front to advocate for the issue, espe-
cially when the proposed change would allow for more immigrants to
enter the United States.  While recent polls may suggest that Americans
are warming to the idea of more immigration, the fact remains that there
is a significant portion of the United States that is staunchly anti-immi-
gration.189  Therefore, it is unlikely, Marsden asserts, that a campaign to
pass legislation in favor of altering the current definition of a refugee to
officially include gender as an acceptable basis of a particular social
group and domestic violence officially as a form of persecution on ac-
count of gender would be successful.190
Marsden published her proposed method of resolving the issues dis-
cussed above revolving around domestic violence as the basis of an asy-
lum claim long before the BIA issued its opinion in Matter of A-R-C-G-.
However, the solution for which she advocates remains both relevant and
persuasive.
C. Amending Definition of Refugee to Include Gender
Another approach would be to amend the definition of a refugee to
include gender as its own standalone category alongside race, religion,
ethnicity, particular social group, and political opinion.  For the sake of
186 Marsden, supra note 143, at 2544–45. R
187 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B)
(2012).
188 Marsden, supra note 143, at 2542–43 (citing especially the importance of the R
Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989).
189 Philip Bump, Americans Turn Against Immigration—But, As Always, It’s Compli-
cated, WASH. POST (June 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/
06/27/americans-turn-against-immigration-but-as-always-its-complicated/.
190 Marsden, supra note 143, at 2543. R
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simplicity, this change would clarify the United States’ recognition of
gender as on equal footing as with the other enumerated bases of asylum.
The change would also have symbolic importance because gender would
be expressly enumerated as opposed to being shoe-horned into the cate-
gory of a particular social group.  Further, a legislative amendment
would have the same effect as Marsden’s proposal, in that both would
codify the position that gender can form a basis of asylum and that do-
mestic violence is expressly considered to be perpetrated on account of
the victim’s gender.  Both solutions would eliminate the logical problem
of circularity, as discussed above, and would offer relatively permanent
solutions to the problem of domestic violence as a basis for asylum.  As
Marsden points out, however, the likelihood of passing a pro-immigra-
tion piece of legislation in the current climate, where immigration reform
is controversial and domestic violence is taboo in many parts of the
United States,191 remains low.  As such, although ideally a change to the
legal definition of a refugee192 would be possible, Marsden’s regulatory
approach that works within the existing framework of asylum law is the
best option currently available.
CONCLUSION
Matter of A-R-C-G- is a small, but positive, step towards allowing
more persecuted women to claim asylum in the United States.  There are,
however, significant gaps in the decision’s scope and staying-power.  To
resolve these gaps, either Marsden’s proposed regulatory amendment or
a legislative amendment that officially allows gender to form the basis of
an asylum claim and that expressly considers domestic violence as gen-
der-based persecution is necessary.  Both solutions would resolve the
problems of circularity, as well as the risk of impermanence, should im-
migration judges choose to read Matter of A-R-C-G- narrowly or should
a BIA comprised of different judges choose to overturn or further narrow
the decision.
Both solutions would also represent an important and positive step
towards protecting victims of gender violence more broadly.  By ex-
pressly allowing gender either to form the basis of a particular social
group or to stand as a separate basis of persecution, victims of other
forms of gender violence besides domestic violence will have an in-
creased likelihood of being granted asylum on the basis of those exper-
iences.  For example, women in Juarez fleeing from high rates of
191 Katie Haas, ACLU Seeks Accountability for Police Violation of the Rights of Domestic
Violence Victims, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (May 28, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/
aclu-seeks-accountability-police-violation-rights-domestic-violence-victims.
192 INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
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femicide193 or women in Kyrgyzstan who fear being kidnapped into mar-
riage194 can derive more certainty from language that clearly protects
against persecution on the basis of gender.  Because the purpose of grant-
ing asylum is to protect groups of people who are victimized on account
of traits that cannot be changed, altering the current statute or regulations
to include women who are victims of violence because they are women
is both morally right and necessary if the United States hopes to continue
to be a safe haven for the vulnerable.
193 See, e.g., John Burnett, Who’s Killing the Women of Juarez?: Mexican City Haunted
by Decade of Vicious Sex Crimes, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 22, 2003), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=1171962; Damien Cave, Wave of Violence Swallows More
Women in Jua´rez, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/world/
americas/wave-of-violence-swallows-more-women-in-juarez-mexico.html?pagewanted=all.
194 Acacia Shields et al., Reconciled to Violence: State Failure to Stop Domestic Abuse
and Abduction of Women in Kyrgyzstan, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 26, 2006), http://www
.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/09/26/reconciled-violence.
